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Abstract
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been generally accepted in academia despite its
well-researched flaws; by understanding how and when markets deviate from efficiency,
investors have an opportunity to not only better understand their investing habits, but also
possibly generate higher investment returns. Various market anomalies, such as the Value Effect
(De Bondt & Thaler, 1985), the Monday Effect (French, 1980), and the January Effect (De
Bondt and Thaler, 1958 & 1987), attest to the fact that markets experience periods of deviation
from efficiency. Fiévet and Sornette (2016) finding that markets experience inefficiency during
periods of significant volatility is confirmed by behavioral finance, which explains how
behavioral heuristics influence investment decisions, specifically greed and fear
(p.38). Andrew Lo based his substitute for the EMH, the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH),
on the supposition that markets become inefficient because of irrational investor behavior
(Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016). In applying these concepts to an individual’s portfolio, it could
provide great insight into their own trading patterns; for investors with higher risk tolerance,
these theories could help produce larger returns for their investment portfolios.
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Behavioral Finance for the Individual Investor
Investors have been investigating and implementing various strategies and techniques
that could lead to returns that outperform the broader market; many investors, however, fail to
achieve this goal. Several researchers, such as Dalbar (2019), Morningstar (2019), and Hsu,
Myers, and Whitby (2016), have found that individual investors typically produce returns that
are abysmal relative to those of common benchmarks and even those of mutual funds. This
historical underperformance is the reason why many professionals and academics in the finance
community have accepted the EMH that was proposed by Eugene Fama (1965, 1986, 1988). The
premise of the EMH is that markets are fully efficient and that individual investors cannot
generate returns that are higher than those of the broader market, also known as alpha or excess
return. Though many researchers have found flaws in the EMH, such as Lo and MacKinlay
(1988), Lo (2017), De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), and Tetlock (2017), the finance
community has not come to agreement on an acceptable replacement. One plausible alternative
for the EMH has surfaced and, while still an exceptionally new theory, it is gaining traction
within the finance community.
Andrew Lo (2017) proposed the AMH in an effort to reconcile market efficiency with
behavioral finance. According to Lo (2017), the stock market is impacted by human decisions
and human decisions are influenced by emotions; the AMH defines the effect that human
behavior has on the stock market and how this behavior influences market efficiency. Lo (2017)
notes various behavioral heuristics that humans exhibit, specifically how humans are inherently
risk averse and exhibit irrational behavior when influenced by greed. Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) asserted that humans dislike losses more than then they like gains, and referred to this
tendency as risk aversion. This fear causes investors to sell during periods of decreasing prices
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and buy during periods of increasing prices; the opposite of the adage of buying low and selling
high (Kahneman, 2018). Greed, derived from previous financial success, prompts investors to
take unreasonable risks and reduce due diligence of investment opportunities (Kets de Vries,
2016). Lo (2017) asserted that once widespread fear overtakes investors, there is often extensive
selling following; times like these are when markets become inefficient and prices do not
accurately reflect securities inherent intrinsic value, the converse is also true is a “greedy”
environment (p. 319).
Introduction to the Efficient Market Hypothesis
One of the most prominent theories in finance, the EMH has been widely recognized by
finance academics and practitioners as being the prevailing explanation of stock market
efficiency. Fama (1970) introduced the EMH, making the claim that stock market prices fully
represent all available information. He described three various forms of stock market efficiency:
a weak from, a semi-strong form, and a strong form. Fama (1970) asserted that under the weak
form all past prices of a stock are reflected in the current stock price, under the semi-strong form
all publicly available information is immediately reflected in the price of the stock, and under the
strong form all information, both public and private, is included in the current price of a stock.
Most of the current discussion on the EMH is on the weak and semi-strong forms, as they are the
most commonly accepted forms of the EMH (Lo, 2017). Fama (1970) claimed that, under the
strong form, all public and private information is automatically considered in the price of a stock;
however, if this were true, insider trading would not be illegal because it would create no
advantage. Nonpublic information can, however, assist in generating positive alpha (Hudson &
Urquhart, 2013). Consequently, most research focuses on the semi-strong and weak forms of the
EMH.
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The EMH, at its core, asserts that no information, insight, or advantage can help investors
achieve superior returns. As Andrew Lo (2017) stated, “Through the power of efficient markets,
we gather all information relevant for our future, we anticipate all potential changes in our
environment, our expectations are rational, and prices full reflect all available information” (pp.
43-44). Lo (2017) also said that, should any advantage present itself, investors will use that until
the effects of that advantage no longer help in producing excess returns; this tactic is referred to
as arbitrage and is how markets remain efficient. Hudson and Urquhart (2013) deduced that,
under the weak form, prices already reflect all information that can be derived from analyzing
market data such as past prices, trading volume metrics, and other related information and
arbitrage would eliminate these profits in an efficient market (Hudson & Urquhart, 2013). The
semi-strong form is similar to the weak form; however, it takes into account public information
as well (Hudson & Urquhart, 2013). A market is said to be efficient if the prices of securities
reflect all publicly available information; thus, if it is possible to use any information to gain an
advantage to generate alpha, a market is said to be inefficient. Studies, such as those by Liu
(2020), Malkiel (2003), and Busse et al. (2010), conclude that markets are, in fact, efficient.
Application of the EMH
Considering the impact that the EMH could have on markets if it is proven to be true, that
it is impossible for investors to outperform markets without taking on additional risk and that
they would be better off buying passive investments, researchers have spent a considerable
amount of time attempting to determine its veracity. As Malkiel (2003) explained, the EMH
infers that “markets do not allow investors to realise [sic] above-average returns without taking
above-average risk” (p. 60). This ability to generate above average returns, without taking on
additional risk, is referred to as alpha or excess returns; producing higher returns through
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increased risk is referred to as beta, which is a measure of volatility. Greenwald et al. (2001)
claimed that active managers cannot use alpha or beta to outperform the market and discovered
that approximately 70% of active professional money managers underperform the market, while
30% outperformed the market. A significant amount of the current research on stock market
efficiency points to the same conclusion: that the EMH is valid.
Many of the current studies on the returns of mutual funds, pensions, and individuals
have found that markets are efficient and rational. Because of this acceptance of the EMH, many
investors and researchers have concluded that equity mangers seem to subtract rather than add
value relative to the performance of the S&P Index (Liu, 2020). Liu (2020) claimed that over
70% of domestic equity mutual funds, not including the poor returns of liquidated funds,
underperformed the S&P composite 1500 index during 2019, while actively managed large-cap
mutual funds underperformed the S&P 500 89.3% of the time over the last ten years. Actively
managed small cap and mid cap mutual funds also fared poorly, as they have underperformed
their respective benchmarks 88.6% and 84.2% of the time, respectively, over the last ten years
(Liu, 2020). Much research has been devoted to the study of mutual funds and it has shown a
common thread of underperformance. Similar to mutual funds, pension funds provide a gleaming
example of how market efficiency works.
Historic Pension Fund Returns
In their study of 769 all-equity U.S. pension funds, Lakonishok, et al. (1992) found that
the equity portion of these pension funds underperformed the S&P 500 by an average of 1.3%
per year from 1983-1989. Though Lakonishok, et al. (1992) said that pension funds inability to
outperform the S&P 500 was likely due to their slant against small-cap stocks, they nevertheless
concluded that, “As far as performance is concerned… equity mangers seem to subtract rather
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than add value relative to the performance of the S&P Index” (p. 378). Additionally, Lakonishok
et al. (1992) found that, from 1971 to 1980, 74% of the pension funds in the Becker database, the
predecessor of the SEI database, underperformed the S&P 500. An interesting discovery in that
study is that the managers of these funds were found to demonstrate a lack of return consistency;
poor performing managers increased returns significantly in the subsequent year and funds with
strong returns had lower returns in the following year. Though there could be many origins as to
what caused this anomaly, the research nevertheless found that there is a correlation between
returns of two time periods.
A similar study conducted by Ippolito and Turner (1987) analyzed the returns of 1,526
U.S. pension funds and found that, from 1977-1983, these pension plans underperformed the
S&P 500 by an average of 0.44% a year, net of expenses and fees. The researchers concluded
that a substantial factor in the underperformance of these funds was due to the stock trading in
the portfolios of active funds (Ippolito, et. al., 1987). Additionally, Busse et al. (2010) performed
a study on 1,448 institutional investment management firms from 1991 to 2008 and found little
proof that these management firms were able to contribute to favorable growth. While the
estimated alpha of the funds in this study was positive, meaning that there were favorable
abnormal returns, the researchers suggested that there was little to no alpha due to several
variations in the estimation techniques (Busse, et. al., 2010).
While the previously listed studies have shown that the EMH is accurate, because most funds
are unable to outperform the broader market, there are studies that counter those findings. Bauer
et al. (2010) recorded the equity returns of U.S. pension funds and concluded that pension funds
were able to outperform their benchmarks by generating positive alpha. In their study of the
returns of 463 defined benefit pension funds from 1997-2006 and 248 defined contribution
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pension funds from 1990-2006, they noted that defined benefit funds and defined contribution
funds generated an average alpha of 1.32% and 1.40% per year, respectively (Bauer et al., 2010).
The fact that these funds have generated positive alpha, outperforming their respective
benchmarks through security selection, is in stark contrast what would be expected under the
EMH. Though the time differences and sample sizes between these studies are notable, the data
is still significant. While most of the previous studies recorded general underperformance among
pension and mutual funds, 26% of pension funds (Lakonishok, 1992) outperformed the S&P 500
and 30% of domestic equity mutual funds outperformed the S&P 1500 composite index (Liu,
2020). Though most studies presented thus far have supported the EMH, Bauer et al. (2010) and
several others provided evidence that sheds light on defects within the EMH.
Anomalies of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
Though many studies provide evidence to support the validity of the EMH, there is a growing
belief within the finance community that market rationality and efficiency does not always hold
(Lo, 2017). As Lo (2017) stated, “Even though most economists have known for years that the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis isn’t an accurate description of market behavior, they’ve continued
to use it because they have nothing strong to replace it” (p. 206). In fact, there are actually
theories that prove markets cannot be efficient because, if they were, no one would have a reason
to trade based off of information; therefore, if markets were truly rational, they would quickly
dissolve because of lack of interest (Lo, 2017). However, there are market anomalies that have
been discovered by researchers that demonstrate how information can help investors outperform
the market; these anomalies allow investors to exploit information to outperform the market
(Jordan et al., 2018). Several of the market anomalies that have been recorded consist of the
January Effect (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985, 1987), the Monday Effect (French, 1980), the Value
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Factor (Hsu et. al., 2016), and the predictability of market returns based on news articles
(Tetlock, 2007). These market anomalies provide further evidence of market inefficiencies and
illuminate not only how markets become inefficient, but also when they become inefficient.
According to the semi-strong and weak forms of the EMH, no public information or historical
price trends should contribute to investors outperforming the broader market.
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) studied the overreaction hypothesis, which asserts that markets
tend to overreact to both good news and bad news, on stocks traded on the New York Stock
Exchange from the beginning of 1926 to the end of 1982 to determine if there was any
predictability following these overreactions. The researchers found that, in the thirty-six months
following a significant change in stock price, poor performing companies outperformed the
market by 19.6% and strong performing companies underperformed the market by 5.0% (De
Bondt & Thaler, 1985). Other pieces of work, such as those by De Bondt and Thaler (1987),
Fama and French (1986, 1988), Howe (1986), Chan (1987) and others, found information similar
to that which was found in De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) study. These researchers also
investigated the returns of value investments and found a similar predictability. De Bondt and
Thaler (1985) found that value stocks typically grow 25% more than growth stocks following a
significant change in price. Doukas et al. (2004) found a similar trend among value stocks and
discerned that they have higher returns because there is greater disagreement among financial
analysts and investors about these companies’ future payoffs relative to stock factors, such as
growth or momentum. Similar to the value anomaly, there are also anomalies exploiting quality
and momentum stocks.
Romahi et al. (2018) noted the behavioral aspects of various stock factors in their study of
the momentum, quality, and low-volatility factor. As described by Romahi et al. (2018), the goal
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of the momentum factor is to profit on investments by going long on assets that have been rising
in price and by shorting assets that have been falling in price (Romahi et al., 2018). This strategy
is based on the human bias that investors tend to underreact to new information in the long-term
and that, without a catalyst for change, prices will continue to rise (Romahi et al., 2018). While
investing the momentum factor, Romahi et al. (2018) also studied the quality factor, which
consists of stocks that appear to have better fundamentals relative to the markets but tend to
provide lower returns compared to the overall market (Romahi et al., 2018). They noted that this
factor can be exploited when investors flock to low quality stocks on the hope that they will
significantly increase in value, also referred to as the lottery-ticket effect, which causes quality
stocks to become undervalued (Romahi et al., 2018). Finally, the researchers measure the
overperformance of low volatility stocks relative to high volatility stocks and concluded that
investors tend to invest more in high volatility stocks in the hope that they will result in
significant gains. As of result of this behavior, the valuation of low volatility stocks decreases
and their future expected returns increases (Romahi et al., 2018).
Bryan (2019) noted that, though the momentum, the quality, the low-volatility, and other
factors can out produce the market over time, investors can maximize their returns by investing
in various factors during specific economic cycles. The author noted the results of BlackRock’s
study of factor timing methods, in which the researchers incorporated data on valuations,
momentum, economic cycles, and dispersion data and found that all these elements, with varying
degrees of significance, provided accurate information for predicting factor performance (Bryan,
2019). One of the most commonly used methods for timing factors is the economic cycle, which
is used by Oppenheimer as well (Bryan, 2019). Both studies found that the factors that
outperform during economic periods of recovery, expansion, slowdown, and contraction are
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value and small cap; momentum, value, and small cap; quality and low volatility; and quality and
low volatility, respectively (Bryan, 2019). This data can be simplified down to mean that stocks
with low valuations and higher volatility outperform during market expansions, while stocks
with low volatility and strong balance sheets outperform during market contractions. Although
using the economic cycle proved to be a good indicator for future factor returns, there is, as
previously mentioned, other economic and market data that can contribute to enhancing factor
timing. While factors and market anomalies are still relatively new concepts, one of the original
finding’s that discounted market inefficiency was presented by Andrew Lo and Craig MacKinlay
in the early 1980s.
Andrew Lo, along with his partner Craig MacKinlay, discovered a major flaw in the EMH. In
their study of weekly stock market returns from 1962-1985, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) rejected
the random walk model and explained that, “the rejection of the random walk cannot be
interpreted as supporting a mean-reverting stationary model of asset prices, but is more
consistent with a specific nonstationary alternative hypothesis” (p. 27). This is due to the fact
they their “results showed that the variance of two-week returns was three times the variance of
one-week returns, not twice the variance as predicted by the Random Walk Hypothesis” (Lo,
2017, p. 48). The relationship between the Random Walk Theory and the EMH is described by
Jordan et al. (2018), where they said that, “random walk is related to the weak-from version of
the efficient markets hypothesis because past knowledge of the stock price is not useful in
predicting future stock prices” (p. 225). In plain English, the researchers suggested that asset
prices have statistical relationships, such averages, variances, and covariances, that change over
time; this is opposed to a stationary model, where the various relationships do not change over
time and have a constant long-term mean and a constant variance independent of time
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(Iordanova, 2020). If these two individuals are correct in their supposition that the variables
involved in stock returns change over time in an unpredictable way, it would imply that the
underlying forces driving the stock market are changing. Similarly, more recent studies have
presented similar conclusions, such as those done by Urquhart and McGroarty (2016) and
Verheyden, Moor, and Vanpée (2015).
Urquhart and McGroarty (2016) tested the predictability of stock returns for the S&P 500,
FTSE 100, NIKKEI225, and EURO STOXX 50 from January 1990 to May 2014 by using three
versions of the variance ratio test method. They found evidence suggesting that market return
predictability fluctuates over time in each market; with some periods of significant market
predictability and other times with no predictability (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016). That can be
interpreted to mean that market efficiency is not an all-of-nothing occurrence, but rather, that
market efficiency evolves overtime (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016). In their analysis of the weak
form of the EMH, Verheyden et al. (2015) compared the daily performance of 272 mutual funds
from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2014 (Verheyden et al., 2015). They concluded that, similar to
Urquhart and McGroarty (2016), the weak form of the EMH is a relative concept that fluctuates
through time, changing because of temporary market distress and deviations from equilibrium
(Verheyden et al., 2015). While the researchers confirmed that most mutual funds
underperformed the market, they determined that market inefficiencies were a large cause of the
underperformance (Verheyden et al., 2015). Fund that were able to outperform the market,
however, did so by limiting losses during times of heightened inefficiency and profiting off of
the subsequent recovery (Verheyden et al., 2015). The main force of this market volatility is
humanity, impacting market inefficiency because of humanity’s various inherent behavioral
heuristics.
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Behavioral Finance and Human Irrationality
Based on the evidence presented by the previous studies, market rationality appears to not
always hold, in which deviations from market efficiency are caused by humanity’s investing
behavior. Bernstein (2003) stated that his research “reveals repeated patterns of irrationality,
inconsistency, and incompetence in the ways human beings arrive at decisions and choices when
faced with uncertainty” (p. 91). All humans have biases that impact their investment decisions
and influence market efficiency, specifically during periods of heightened market volatility. One
of the first theories that sparked interest in the field of behavioral finance was proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) research began by studying the utility theory; however,
they proposed an alternative theory that is now considered to be a fundamental aspect of
behavioral finance: Prospect Theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) used Prospect Theory to
debunk the expected utility theory, which is where individuals strive to choose actions that result
in the highest expected utility, and promote the idea that individuals are loss-averse because they
dislike losses more than they like gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). By simplifying prospect
theory, it can be interpreted to mean that, given a choice of equal probabilities of success
between increasing one’s wealth and preserving one’s wealth, they will prefer to elect to
preserve their wealth. Prospect Theory provided a foundation for another theory that had many
implications: risk aversion.
Hardin and Looney (2012) built off of the Prospect Theory and stated that investors will
be more likely to succumb to loss aversion, which occurs when investors weigh losses more
heavily than gains and when they review the returns of their assets over a short period of time,
referred to as mental accounting. Mental accounting is the way in which humans frame
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decisions; in the case of an investor, it would be considering the price of a stock over the short
term as opposed to the long term (Hardin & Looney, 2012). Compared to safer assets, equities
are riskier over the short-term and are more likely to experience periods of heightened volatility.
However, when considering the returns of equities over a long time period, their returns are
significantly higher than those of safe assets (Hardin & Looney, 2012). As the time frame of an
investor decreases, the more likely they are to succumb to loss aversion; the opposite also
applies, where investors with a long-term time frame are less likely to give in to loss aversion
(Hardin & Looney, 2012). A combination of mental accounting and loss aversion, as described
by Benartzi and Thaler (1993), is when investors are unwilling to bear the risks associated with
holding equities because of loss aversion and mental accounting (p. 4). Because individuals are
loss averse, the more often an individual reviews their portfolio, the more likely they are to sell
their stocks and invest in lower risk securities, such as bonds or money market accounts
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1993).
Neurological Characteristics
The primary sources that instigate market irrationality are fear and greed. Based on prior
research, humans appear to have natural responses to financial loss and gain. In a study of the
brain’s reward system, Breiter (2001), along with the contribution of Kahneman, used functional
magnetic resonance (fMRI) to discover how monetary gain and loss activated the brain (Lo,
2011). Participants were placed in a fMRI and tasked with playing a simple gambling game that
had three potential outcomes; losing part or all of their money, retaining the same amount of
money, or increasing the amount of money (Breiter, 2001). Each participant was given $50 to
start with and the programming was designed so that each participant would generate earnings of
$78.50 (Breiter, 2001). Breiter (2001) discovered that, as the monetary rewards grew, so did the
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activation in the following parts of the brain: the nucleus accumbus, part of the reward system;
the amygdala, associated with emotional responses; and the ventral tegmental area, which
discharges dopamine into the reward system (Lo, 2011). Each of these previously mentioned
components of the brain influence human’s responses to various experiences.
Greed is fueled by dopamine that is released into the nucleus accumbens, the pleasure
centers of our brains (Lo, 2011). The brains reward system, in which behaviors are established
and reinforced, is controlled by dopamine when it experiences various stimuli such as money,
sex, food, cocaine, methamphetamine, and other activities (Lo, 2011). Thus, when individuals
gain money or possessions, dopamine is released into the nucleus accumbus, which results in a
pleasurable neurological effect (Lo, 2011). Though the release of dopamine is neurologically
pleasant, individuals are motivated by the mere anticipation of dopamine release, not just the
after-effect (Wago et al., 2009). However, when people get what they want, financial success in
this case, they subsequently want even more (Kets de Vries, 2016). These individuals need a
bigger “hit” of financial success, producing more dopamine, in order to maintain the same “high”
(Kets de Vries, 2016). For investors, this cycle of greed results in overconfidence, over trading,
and poor due diligence, contributing to significant underperformance (Wago, et. al., 2009)
However, due to the temporary high investors gets from making profits, they will continue to
participate in this behavioral pattern, continually increasing the degree of potential financial risk
and loss (Kets de Vries, 2016).
This psychological reward-system is the reason that Lo (2017) concluded that, at its most
basic level, the Great Recession was caused because greed overpowered fear, as assets inflated to
prices beyond their intrinsic value. Lo (2011) went on to explain that human’s dopamine system
often leads to greater-risk taking and, if risky financial undertakings are linked to monetary
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increase, then a “potentially destructive positive-feedback loop can easily emerge from a period
of lucky draws” (p. 14). Leading up to the Great Recession, investors were becoming greedy due
to a strong market rally from the technology bubble of the early 2000s, causing investors to
become over-confident and less skeptical of investment decisions (Kets de Vries, 2016). While
greed has, in fact, contributed to severe market downturns and market irrationality, fear also has
played a significant role in producing inefficiency and market declines.
Though the financial implications of investor greed are similar to that of fear, they
operate behaviorally and neurologically in different ways. For example, people’s reaction to
financial loss is more extreme that their reaction to financial gain (Harley, 2016). Based on risk
aversion, this is true, but there is a psychological element that this is attributable to (Hardin &
Looney, 2012). Theoretically, if a stock declines 20% in one day, its investors would probably be
tempted to sell that security regardless of what fundamental changes sparked this decline, but
why? This example would trigger the part of the brain referred to as the amygdala, which is
responsible for the brain’s fear processing system (Ressler, 2010). Upon an event that induces
fear related stimuli, such as fearful faces, fear inducing images, and fear conditioned cues, the
amygdala begins to influence that brain’s functionality; as it applies to finance, this could include
fearful news articles and fear induced market selloffs (Ressler, 2010). Davis and Whalen (2001)
noted that “the amygdala is especially activated under conditions of uncertainty” (p. 27).
Referring back to the valuation anomaly, where low priced stocks experience higher returns in
the future, Doukas et al. (2004) recognized that there is heightened uncertainty surrounding value
stocks which activates investors amygdala’s and induces a fearful reaction that causes investors
to sell their assets, causing less demand and lower prices for these companies.
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Typically, the prefrontal cortex is responsible for the “executive control” of the mind, as
it sends and receives instructions from nearly all sensory and motor systems (Miller & Cohen,
2001, pp. 168, 193). However, when experiencing fear induced stimuli, the amygdala becomes
activated and overrides the prefrontal cortex; typically, this happens without our conscious
realizing it (Maren, 2001). Lo (2017) noted that the fear response in the brain “sidesteps” the
functions of the prefrontal cortex, which is what we associate with human rationality (p. 82).
Based on Pavlovian fear conditioning, the human amygdala’s signal intensifies when exposed to
stimuli that predicts an aversive event in the future (Davis & Whalen, 2001). Thus, humans need
not currently be in a state of fear for the amygdala to regulate brain functioning, as a future event
that produces fear will activate the amygdala’s functioning over the brain; for investors, this
could mean that, prior to a fear inducing event, investors may sell their riskier assets due to the
fear of a fear producing event. Thus, when faced with this significant financial loss, the
individual’s amygdala processes the fear emotion that, all too often, causes individuals to sell
this security in the spur of the moment. Consider the following example to understand the
implication of the amygdala’s function for investors in the stock market.
Using the previously example, assume the S&P 500 index falls 10% in one day. Using a
psychological approach, many people’s amygdalae would probably become activated and begin
superseding the prefrontal cortex because of the significant losses that they were confronted
with. The amygdala, in respond to this stimuli, would produce responses that would cause
investors to sell their riskier assets because of the fear of additional losses. If this occurs on a
large enough scale, this would cause the market to decrease significantly based on supply and
demand, unless a great number of savvy investors take a contrarian approach and decide to buy.
If the market falls below its inherent intrinsic value based on the information currently available
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to investors, then the market is not being efficient. As the research in, “The Psychology of
Investing” describes, “If we look at the S&P not just from one month to another, but over its
140+ year history, we see… there are long phases of deviation from the EMH. The largest
deviations occur in times of speculative bubbles and crashes” (Nofsinger, 2017, pp. 27-28).
Thus, this theoretical scenario appears to be more than just an example, it is what typically
happens during stock market crashes.
Though the aforementioned example is extremely simplified and does not include many
other factors, such as the economic impact of companies’ current and future earnings, it does
have wide-reaching implications for portfolio management. Events like the one described is what
led Daniel Kahneman (2015) to conclude that, “’losses loom larger than gains’ and that people
are loss averse” (p. 284). Though selling during an initial downturn may prevent losses if losses
continue, it could result in lost opportunity cost by not being invested when the stock market
rebounds. Theoretically, if an investor could perfectly time the stock market, selling at the top
and buying at the bottom would be ideal, however, Hsu et al. (2016), Dalbar (2019), and others
suggest that timing the stock market in this fashion typically results in diminished performance.
Hsu, Myers, and Whitby (2016) documented the returns of mutual funds versus the
returns of individuals using data from the CRSP Mutual Funds Database. The researchers found
that, “although the buy-and-hold average returns for value mutual funds have outperformed the
market portfolio, the dollar weighted average returns of these same fund meaningfully
underperformed the market portfolio” (Hsu et al., 2016, p. 2). Their evidence suggests that
investors invest money into value-based mutual funds right before periods of significant
underperformance and liquidates their position before periods of strong performance (Hsu et al.,
2016). While mutual funds focusing on value investments outperformed the S&P 500 index by
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an average of 0.39% per year from January 1991 to June 2013, the average value investor in
mutual funds underperformed the S&P 500 by 0.92% over the same time frame (Hsu et al.,
2016). Over every mutual fund category, the researchers found that individual investors were
giving up almost 2% per year because of poor market timing (Hsu et al., 2016). While it is
possible that these investors have rational reasons to sell, Hsu, Myers, and Whitby’s (2016)
research suggests that individual mutual fund investors have significantly higher risk aversion
than institution investors; this is the primary reason individual investors time the market poorly
and, consequently, have lower returns (Hsu et al., 2016).
Dalbar, a financial market research firm that specializes in behavioral finance, conducted
a study of investor returns compared with the S&P 500 index’s from the end of 1995 to the end
of 2015. Dalbar found that, while the S&P 500 index averaged annual returns of 9.85%, average
investors had an average annual return of only 5.19% (Remsburg, 2019). Dalbar (2020)
performed a similar study and found results that were similar to those previously mentioned.
From 2000 to 2019, while the S&P 500 and Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Bond Index
generated annual returns of 6.06% and 5.03% respectively, individuals in equities and fixed
income securities realized annual returns of 4.25% and 0.47% respectively (“Don’t Let
Emotions”, 2019). Kinnel, Kowara, Pham, and Strauts (2019) produced a similar report to that of
Dalbar, in which they researched the difference between the annual returns of U.S. funds and
those of individual investors from 2009 to 2018. While the primary findings of these studies
were the same, the results were less dramatic in the Kinnel, Kowara, Pham, and Strauts’s (2019)
study. They found that the returns of U.S. fixed income and equity funds outperformed the
returns of fixed income and equity investors by an average of 0.56% and 0.57% a year,
respectively (Kinnel et al., 2019). Other researchers, such as Friesen and Sapp (2007) and Dichev

BEHAVIORAL FINANCE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR

21

(2007), performed similar studies and found that individual investors underperformed by an
average of 1.56% and at least 1.3% a year, respectively.
Though they might not be able to explain why, typically, the first thing that Wall Street
Traders tell junior traders is to, “in the face of losses, fight the tendency to be too risk-seeking;
and in the face of gains, fight the tendency to be too risk averse” (Lo, 2017, p. 60). The reason is
because pride goes before a financial loss and because fear of losses causes losses (Burnham,
2008). Take, for example, one of the anomalies in the EMH, the valuation effect, and apply it to
the previous example. The market begins to fall and people sell because they are scared of
additional losses. However, in remembering that the valuation effect says that if a stock’s
valuations decrease, such as the price-earnings and price-book ratios, then those same stocks will
likely outperform the market in the future. So, if this theoretical news sparks a market sell-off,
but the company’s earnings are still strong to the point where their price-earnings ratio is
decreasing, then buying a variety of companies with falling price-earnings or price-book ratio’s
in the midst of the market’s fear will, theoretically, exploit market inefficiency and produce a
favorable future outcome. This reasoning is why Lo (2017) notes that current finance
practitioners and academics refute the EMH but, due to a lack of a replacement, must still adhere
to it. Consequently, in order to amend the flaws in the current way of thinking, Lo (2017)
decided to create his own theory: the AMH.
Introduction to The Adaptive Market Hypothesis
The AMH takes into account market anomalies, periods of market inefficiency, and
human behavior, explaining that humans’ behavior, as previously mentioned, is the primary
driver of market inefficiency or efficiency. Lo (2017) mentioned that the AMH, contrary to the
EMH, does not imply that market efficiency is an “all-or nothing condition, but a continuum” (p.
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279). Lo believed that this continuum of market efficiency is driven by the fact that humans learn
and evolve from past experiences. Lo (2017) stated, “We display behavioral biases and make
apparently suboptimal decisions, but can learn from past experience and revise our heuristics in
response to negative feedback” (p. 188). When humans are operating irrationality and those
irrational actions cause negative events, humans will learn from those occurrences and will
develop from them. Market efficiency is particularly dependent on the relative proportion of
market participants making investing decisions with their prefrontal cortexes, using a logical
methodology, and those who use their amygdala to inform their investment decisions, a fearbased approach (Lo, 2017).
While the EMH supports the ideology that humans are rational, the AMH does not claim
that humans are always irrational. While it is true that markets are often irrational due to various
irregularities in human behavior, they are not always irrational (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016).
Humans become irrational when they are prompted by fear or greed to act in an illogical way.
When humans do act irrationality, however, the effects of this irrationality can “compound
across individuals, placing the wisdom of crowds with the madness of mobs” (Lo, 2017, p. 51).
As previously mentioned, one of the main triggers leading up to the Great Recession was that
greed overpowered fear (Lo, 2017). Because there was an increased amount of greed, and higher
demand than supply, prices continued to increase and investors began overlooking the impending
financial loss because of the potential for more financial gain. This is a very simplistic approach
to the application of the AMH, but many in academia are testing this theory with much more
complex, detailed scenarios.
One such study, by Urquhart and McGroarty (2016), tested the AMH proposed by Lo
(2017) by analyzing the predictability of stock returns for the S&P 500, FTSE 100, NIKKEI225,
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and EURO STOXX 50 (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016). The researchers analyze these four
popular indices from January 1990 to May 2014 by using three versions of the variance ratio test
method (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016). They found evidence that market return predictability
fluctuates over time in each market, with some periods of significant market predictability and
other times where there is no predictability (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016). That can be
interpreted to mean that market efficiency is not an all-of-nothing occurrence, but rather that
market efficiency evolves overtime (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016). The researchers conclude by
confirming the claims of the AMH, that “markets adapt differently over time and interact
differently to varying market conditions” (Urquhart & McGroarty, 2016, p. 48).
Another study, as presented by Fièvet and Sornette (2016), performed an exhaustive
study of the FTSE, S&P 500, and CSI 300 indices from 1997-2015 and concluded that markets
are efficient during all times except throughout periods of market crises, during which the EMH
does not hold. In periods of market downturns, specifically during the dot-com bubble and the
Great Recession of 2008-2009, the researchers conclude that the market does not adhere to the
EMH and there are various areas of predictability that arise (Fiévet & Sornette, 2016). They also
conclude that various behavioral heuristics influence investors behavior during periods of
heightened volatility, especially investor herding to safe-haven assets; this creates systematic
biases that allow investors to implement arbitrage strategies to generate alpha (Fiévet & Sornette,
2016). Additionally, Verheyden et al. (2015) describes markets through the lens of the AMH,
saying that markets are efficient and rational most of the time, but there are times of market
inefficiency caused by behavioral biases. Markets become inefficient when behavioral
predispositions influence investors behavior and investors continue to compete with each other
until a new equilibrium is formed (Verheyden et al., 2015).
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Verheyden et al. (2015) concluded that markets are typically inefficient during periods of
market downturn. The researchers performed an analysis evaluating the weak form of the EMH
by comparing the daily performance of 272 mutual funds from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2014
(Verheyden et al., 2015). The researchers conclude that the weak form of the EMH is a relative
concept that changes through time, changing because of temporary market distress and
deviations from equilibrium (Verheyden et al., 2015). While the researchers confirmed that most
mutual funds underperform the market, they determined that market inefficiencies were a large
cause of the underperformance (Verheyden et al., 2015). Fund that were able to outperform the
market, however, did so by limiting losses during times of heightened volatility and profiting
from the subsequent recovery (Verheyden et al., 2015).
These studies proposed that market inefficiencies are a result of either market downturns
or because of behavioral biases. As markets begin to perform poorly, either from poor economic
results or poor future earnings growth, the associated news relating to market developments will
likely induce a fear-producing response among investors. As this amygdala induced response
causes investors to irrationally sell, markets will then, as result, become inefficient (Ressler,
2010). As Lo (2017) explains, for example, “The Adaptive Market Hypothesis tells us that, at the
most basic level of the financial crisis, greed overwhelmed fear” (p. 319). Additionally, as
Greenwald et al. (2001) said, investors are in the grip of behavioral biases that influence them to
pay too much for growth companies with high expected earnings potential and too little for value
companies with lower expected earnings potential.
The EMH explains what generally happens during periods of no volatility or when fear
induced selling and greed induced buying is limited, however, it fails to explain market
inefficiency when the market dynamics change because of behavioral biases. As Lo (2017) said,
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“It’s not hard to come up with simple rules of thumb to follow when the environment contains
predictable elements”, but what happens when the environment changes (p. 66)? Many
behavioral biases are due to humanity’s natural tendency to forecast and plan for the future in
their current environment, it is assumed, however, that the environment will not change (Lo,
2017). When the market dynamics change, the uncertainty and fear of potential losses induces an
irrational response that, as noted by MFS Investment Management, typically results in selling
that results in weakened future earnings potential (Bernstein, 2003). Understanding the
implications of human behavior on market efficiency is important, however, incorporating the
concepts of behavioral finance and market inefficiency into an individual’s investment
management process can be extremely beneficial.
Using Behavioral Patterns as an Indicator
Behavioral heuristics among professionals and individual investors contributes
significantly to their overall underperformance, however, investors can capitalize of these
behavioral tendencies by being aware of their own biases. Intuitively, investors probably know to
buy low and sell high, but they often do the opposite in practice. Based on the overall
underperformance of investors from the Dalbar and Morningstar data, it is logical to conclude
that it is difficult to outperform the broader market. When influenced by fear or greed inducing
stimuli, investors struggle to make rational decisions. Thus, most investors should not seek to
use behavioral heuristics to improve investment returns, but for those that understand the risks
associated with investing during periods of market irrationality, it could prove to be profitable.
Though many of the strategies for exploiting market anomalies and market inefficiencies
are available to the public, investors still tend to underperform the market; this is due to investors
trying to time the market based on behavioral heuristics (Hsu et al., 2016). Because investors
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have a difficult time watching their investments decrease in value during downturns and
underperform the market during rallies, most investors should invest in a diversified portfolio
that fits their risk profile and not actively monitor it, but perform a review periodically. In a
typical buy and hold strategy, investors would buy a passive investment, such as an ETF, and
hold it for several years; these forms of investments would likely perform very closely to the
broader market, which is great for most investors who want to perform similar to the broader
market. From January of 1871 to June of 2020 the S&P 500 index has had an compounded
annual growth rate of 4.5% a year; investors who chose to invest in a low-cost investment
vehicle tracking the S&P 500 would still experience modest returns without dealing with the
hassle of trying to time the market (Shiller, 2020). However, for investors who control their
emotions and have a higher risk tolerance, it may be possible to exploit market inefficiencies by
implementing a variation of the “buy-the-dip investment” strategy.
Buy-The-Dip Strategy
Yan et. al. (2020), in their analysis of long-term stock market returns, said that “if we
conclude that the market will act similarly to how it has in the past, then we can assume that
there will be short term stock decreases but increases in the long term” (p. 2). Ning (2018)
performed a study evaluating the impact that declines had on future returns on the stocks in the
Russell 1000 index from 2002 through 2016. They documented the returns on securities that fell
more than 10% relative to the broader market index and found that these securities produced
cumulative excess returns, also known as alpha, of 0.47% after one day and 28% after 240 days
(Ning, 2018). Additionally, companies that have the lowest valuation tend to higher excess
returns than those with higher valuations (Ning, 2018). Thus, investors who sold their stocks
after periods of significant market volatility would have missed out on significant market gains,
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while those who had invested when the market performed poorly would have outperformed the
historical return of the S&P 500, not accounting for dividends (Ning, 2020). While this could be
a potentially promising strategy for investors, it still requires much more research before it
should be implemented.
Based on prior research, markets and investments are generally considered to be
inefficient when they are trading either above or below their inherent intrinsic value; these would
be characterized by heightened levels of greed and fear, respectively. However, monitoring stock
valuations and macroeconomic conditions is typically unfeasible for individual investors. Thus,
based on the aforementioned details and implications of behavioral finance, the best time to buy
is when one is the most scared of losing money in the market. While this sounds very illogical, as
an individual investors, many other investors will likely experience the same emotional reaction
to severe market downturns; the difference is that they will miss out on the subsequent upside,
while investors buying in the midst of fear would be capitalizing on the following market
rebound. It is important for the investor, however, to determine if they can handle the potential
risks associated with this type of strategy and can maintain this strategy over the long-term.
Biblical Integration
Understanding the correlation between the EMH and behavioral finance allows investors
to understand how and when markets experience inefficiencies, allowing them to capitalize on
other investor’s irrational behavior. While this strategy could prove to be profitable for some, it
is critical to realize one’s goals when determining an investment strategy. Exploiting market
inefficiencies is not designed to be a “get rich quick” strategy; Proverbs 21:5 states that “[t]he
plans of the diligent lead to profit as surely as haste leads to poverty” (New International
Version, 1978/2011, Proverbs 21:5). Also, investors should realize that “godliness with
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contentment is great gain. For we brought nothing into the world, and we can take nothing out of
it” (New International Version, 1978/2011, 1 Timothy 6:6-7). Kets de Vries (2016) put it this
way: “the happiest people are not the ones with the best or most things, but those who appreciate
what they have” (p. 17). Being good stewards of what we have been given, we should not seek to
lay up treasures on Earth, but to be generous with the provisions God has given us; as “Do not
lay up for yourselves treasures on earth… but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven… For
where your treasure is, there your heart will be also (English Standard Version, 2011, Matthew
6:19-21).
Conclusion
By understanding the underpinnings of stock market efficiency and inefficiency through
the EMH, as well as psychology and a little bit of neuroscience, it is possible to produce a
strategy that could outperform the broader market on a consistent basis. Comprehending how
humans respond to fear and what influences their decisions in times of uncertainty can inform
investors decisions about when to buy and what to buy. Based on prior research, one of the most
straightforward ways to generate excess return is to buy during widespread selloffs, which is
when it is the most difficult psychologically to buy stocks (Lo, 2017). Thus, by purchasing bonds
until a market selloff, in which the investor would sell their bonds and buy stocks, it is possible
for the investor to outperform the broader market. While this strategy has not been tested
accounting for the impact of bonds in an investor’s portfolio, prior research suggests that even a
typical buy-the-dip strategy has the potential to outperform the broader market (Yan et. al.,
2020). As such, considering the effect that human psychology and behavior has on investment
decisions can serve to not only inform investors, but to give them insight into how to time
investment purchases.
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